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Abstract 
In this paper, we present both a theoretical and an empirical model in order to identify the effects 
of disability on wages. In the theoretical model we assume that the wage gap of a disabled worker 
depends on a permanent and a transitory productivity gap and the model predicts that the wage gap 
will be lower after gaining some work experience in the new job. We test this theoretical hypothesis 
using an exogenous disability shock and matching methods associated with treatment effect 
techniques for policy evaluation. In all our specifications, we find that the reduction of the wage for 
the disabled is between 293 and 342 euros per month expressed in constant terms at 2010 prices 
(21-24% of the average wage of disabled workers) but this reduction is more than offset when we 
take into account both the disability benefits and the wage. As predicted in the theoretical model, 
we observe that the pay gap between the disabled and the non-disabled individuals falls over time 
once the transitory drop in productivity disappears. However, we observe a constant wage gap that 
remains over time and that corresponds to the permanent fall in productivity predicted by the 
theoretical model. 
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1. Introduction 
During the last years, disability policies have attracted particular attention in OECD 
(Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development) countries both because 
they represent an important source of government expenditure and because societies are 
becoming more and more concerned about the need to strengthen the integration of 
disabled individuals in the society.  
For the case of Spain, the strong incidence of the current economic crisis will probably 
push many employed people with a disability out of the labour market as this group of 
individuals represents one of the most vulnerable groups in the society. Therefore, 
several international organizations recommend governments to foster reforms that will 
help disabled individuals maximize their work capacity and keep or find jobs. Not only 
international organizations are advocating for this strategy but also several studies and 
organizations of people with disabilities have stressed the need to promote the labor 
market integration of disabled individuals as a way of facilitating their broader 
integration in the society.  
For these reasons, the possibility of increasing the number of disabled people that work 
is regarded as a good way to decrease the pressures on the financial stability of the 
social security system as well as to reach the social integration of disabled individuals.  
However, a closer look into the data reveals that this objective is far from being reached 
in most developed countries and employment rates of disabled individuals are 
particularly low for the case of Spain.  
As it can be seen in figure 1 below, employment rates of self-reported disabled 
individuals in Spain remained quite low at a 35% level even if the GDP growth has 
been quite high at around 2-6% between 1996 and 2007.12 This is one of the lowest 
rates in the OECD, where employment rates for self-reported disabled individuals are 
45% in the UK, 40% in Australia, 50% in Luxembourg, 45% in Norway or 52% in 
Switzerland. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 This data is taken from a report from the OECD and it is, therefore, comparable for these countries. 
2 The general employment rate increased by 7% between 2001 and 2007. In turn, 3.5% of the Spanish 
population is receiving disability benefits in 2010. 
Figure 1. Employment rates by disability status in the late-2000s 
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These very low employment rates for the disabled in Spain occur despite several 
policies (both anti-discrimination and labour promotion policies) that aim at ensuring 
that disabled individuals have the same labour market opportunities than their non-
disabled counterparts. Therefore, apart from the evidence that disabled individuals have 
lower employment rates, in this paper we also want to explore whether they have 
another disadvantage in terms of labour market opportunities and we want to test 
whether the onset of an unexpected disabling condition does also entail reduced 
earnings for the disabled. At the same time, if we find empirical evidence that this is 
indeed the case for the disabled in Spain, we are also interested in analysing whether 
this wage gap with respect to their non-disabled counterparts is permanent in time or is 
reduced over time. In other words, we want to know if disabled individuals are able to 
“catch up” in terms of wages lost due to the disabling condition. 
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There are a few papers in the literature that have tried to estimate the dynamic impact of 
disability on wages, addressing specifically the issue of whether this wage gap 
decreases or not over time. Using self-reported information about disability in the US, 
Charles (2003) analyses the evolution of expected earnings of worked-limited disabled 
men over time, both before and after the individual suffers onset. He finds that expected 
earnings show a sharp drop around the data of onset and then recover during the 
following periods.  In a more recent study and using the same database, Mok et al. 
(2008) find much larger losses from disability than those published in Charles (2003).3  
Due to the characteristics of the data they use, these papers are not able to distinguish 
between different types of disability. As Charles (2003) mentioned, the type of 
disability such as accident or illness may have different effects in the temporal pattern 
of earning losses as well as it may raise some endogeneity concerns. In our paper we 
make use of a Spanish administrative database that will allow us to go a step further and 
identify the source of the disabling condition so that we can have a measure of an 
exogenous disability shock that does not affect earnings before the date of onset.  
For the case of Spain, Garcia-Gomez and Lopez-Nicolás (2006) make use of the 
European Community Household Panel dataset to try to estimate the effect of past 
health events on current changes in labour status. Using a matching technique, their 
results show that there are important effects of disability shocks on income as total 
individual income is reduced. In particular, they estimate the reduction in personal 
income to be 1648 euros/year in the year of the disability shock and 1740 euros for the 
second year. They find that the drop in labour income is not fully compensated by social 
security transfers. Due to the small sample sizes for the treatment and control groups, 
the authors are not able to estimate the effects on subsequent periods. 
The very recent administrative database that we use allows us to go a step further than 
the work in Garcia-Gomez and Lopez-Nicolás. First, we present a more updated study 
of the effects of disability on wages (from 1996-2010) than the paper by Garcia-Gomez 
and Lopez-Nicolás (1994-2001). Second, and due to the longer time span of our data, 
we are able to uncover whether disabled individuals are able to “catch up” in terms of 
wages with respect to their non-disabled counterparts. Third, we are able to identify the 
source of the disabling condition so that we can have a measure of a disability shock 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 This result is in line with the evidence found by Meyer and Mok (2006) in a previous study. 
that is clearly exogenous and finally, we also present a theoretical model to derive some 
predictions of the impact of disability on wages and the evolution of this impact over 
time that we later test in the empirical section. 
Therefore, in this paper we present both a theoretical model and an empirical model in 
order to identify the effects of disability generated by an accident on wages and the 
channels underlying this relationship. In the theoretical wage gap model we assume that 
the wage gap of a disabled worker depends on a permanent and a transitory productivity 
gap. The permanent component is due to the disability condition after the disability 
shock while the transitory component is related to the presence of assimilation costs for 
being in a different job or professional activity, which reduces the implicit bargaining 
power of the disabled employee. Thus, the model predicts that the wage gap will be 
lower after some work experience in the new job but that the permanent wage gap 
component will remain. 
We test this theoretical hypothesis with an empirical model in which we want to 
estimate how much wages change, on average, for those individuals who become 
disabled due to an exogenous disability shock, compared to the hypothetical state of not 
having received the disability shock that causes the disabling condition. We also 
estimate the evolution of this wage gap over time. As one of the main problems in 
measuring this change is the endogeneity of the disability status and the wages, we only 
include in our sample individuals that become disabled due to an accident (which is an 
exogenous disability shock) and estimate the Average Treatment Effect on the Treated 
(ATET). Therefore, we want to know what would have happened to that individual if he 
or she had not become disabled (counterfactual) and, as we do not have that 
information, we make use of matching methods to allow for the counterfactual 
approach, associated with treatment effects techniques for program evaluation. In 
particular we estimate the effect of disability on wages by matching on the propensity 
score. 
In all our specifications, we find that the reduction of the wage for the disabled is 
between 293 and 342 euros per month expressed in constant terms at 2010 prices 
(which represents between 21% and 24% of the average wage of disabled workers) but 
this reduction is more than offset when we take into account both the wage and the 
disability benefits that they get. For the entire group of disabled individuals (the ones 
that work and the ones that do not have a job), we still find a drop in income for the 
disabled relative to the non-disabled individuals. Therefore, those individuals would 
have obtained a higher income by just working in the hypothetical case of not having 
suffered the disabling condition. Finally, we observe that the pay gap between the 
disabled and the non-disabled individuals falls over time as predicted in the theoretical 
model so that the transitory drop in productivity is disappearing. However, we observe a 
constant wage gap component associated with the permanent fall in productivity 
predicted in the theoretical model that remains over time. 
There are also a number of studies that analyze the effects on the income loss of 
disabled individuals in other countries. For example, Lechner and Vazquez-Alvarez 
(2011), using matching methods, find that there is no statistically significant evidence 
for a reduction in income due to disability for the case of Germany and so they conclude 
that the German social security system is able to mitigate the economic disadvantages of 
the disabling condition. Contoyannis and Rice (2001) study a similar thing for the UK 
using the British Household Panel Survey and find that positive self-assessed health 
increases the hourly wage for females while reduced psychological health reduces the 
hourly wages for males. Also for the UK, Kidd et al. (2000) focus on the differences in 
labour market outcomes between disabled and able-bodies individuals and they confirm 
the presence of substantial wage and participation rate differences between the two 
groups. Their estimates suggest that, on average, the disabled earn 14,8% less than the 
able bodied. Restricting the sample to include only males from the UK, Walker and 
Thomson (1996) estimate a very small effect of disability status on wages once they 
take into account the endogeneity of schooling on health. Lundborg et al. (2011) apply a 
diff-in-diff approach to Swedish data and find that the effects of a disability shock are 
stronger in terms of reduced labour earnings for individuals with low education and this 
effect is stronger for older individuals. 
The paper proceeds as follows: section 2 describes the specificities of the Spanish 
disability System. Section 3 introduces the theoretical wage gap model. Sections 4 and 5 
present the empirical strategy and the database, respectively. Section 6 constructs the 
treatment and control groups and section 7 presents some descriptive statistics. Finally, 
the main results are summarized in section 8 and some conclusions are derived in the 
final part of the paper. 
2. The Spanish Disability System  
In order to solve the endogeneity problem between the disability and the labour market 
status and the numerous problems related to self-reported measures of health or 
disability status, for this paper we will only include in our sample individuals that 
become disabled due to an exogenous disability shock (an accident) and that begin 
receiving disability benefits due to this disability shock. With this sample selection 
restriction, we make sure that the disability shock received by the individual is 
exogeneous as an accident is an unexpected event and it is externally assessed by a 
medical team before receiving the benefits. 
The disability system in Spain distinguishes between two types of permanent disability 
benefits: i) contributory, which are given to individuals who have generally contributed 
to the Social Security system before the onset of the disabling condition; ii) and non-
contributory, which are given to individuals who are assessed to be disabled but have 
never contributed to the Social Security system (or do not reach the minimum 
contributory requirement to access the contributory system). Non-contributory disability 
benefits are means-tested and managed at the regional level. 4  
The size of the non-contributory system is relatively small compared to the contributory 
system (197,126 individuals received non-contributory disability benefits in 2009, while 
920,860 received contributory benefits during the same year). The amount of benefits 
received is also smaller in the non-contributory case (the average non-contributory 
pension is 417.09 Euros/month compared to an average contributory disability pension 
of 831.49 Euros/month). As we want to assess the effect of disability on wages, in the 
remaining of the paper we focus only on the permanent contributory disability system in 
Spain. 
The Social Security defines the permanent contributive disability insurance as the 
economic benefits to compensate the individual for losing a certain amount of wage or 
professional earnings when affected by a permanent reduction or complete loss of 
his/her working ability due to the effects of a pathologic or a traumatic process derived 
from an illness or an accident.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 Income is evaluated yearly. The income threshold in 2010 was set at 4,755.80 Euros/year for an 
individual living alone. This amount is adjusted if the individual lives with other members. 
In order to capture the different situations in which a person can be after suffering from 
a disabling condition, the Spanish Social Security administration uses a classification of 
three main degrees of disability that depend on the working capacity lost:5 
(i) Partial disability (57% of claimants): the individual is impaired to develop all or 
the fundamental tasks of his/her usual job or professional activity, but he/she is 
still capable of developing a different job or professional activity. 
(ii) Total disability (40% of claimants): the individual is impaired for the 
development of any kind of job or professional activity. 
(iii) Severe Disability (3% of claimants): Individuals who, as a result of anatomic or 
functional loses, need the assistance of a third person to develop essential 
activities of daily living such as eating, moving, etc. 
The eligibility requirements and the pension amount depend on the source of the 
disability (ordinary illness, work related or unrelated accident or occupational illness), 
the level of the disability and the age of the onset of the disabling condition. Table 1 
summarizes the main parameters of both the eligibility criteria and the pension formula. 
With respect to eligibility, the number of years of contributions required depends on the 
age of the onset of the disabling condition for common illness while there are no 
contributory requirements if the health impairment is due to either an accident or an 
occupational illness.   
The total amount of the pension is obtained by multiplying a percentage, which varies 
depending on the type of pension and the degree of disability (as shown in the last rows 
of Table 1) to the regulatory base, which depends on the source of the disability and on 
previous salaries.6 The percentage is 55% or 75% for partial disability beneficiaries, 
100% for total disability and 150% for severe disability.  
The number of years included in the regulatory base depends on the source of the 
disability; for common illness the regulatory base is calculated by dividing by 112 the 
wage in the last 96 months (8 years) before becoming disabled. When the source of the 
disability is a work-unrelated accident, the regulatory base is calculated by dividing by 
28 the wage in the last 24 months before becoming disabled. The individual can choose 
these 24 months from the last 7 years of work. For work-related accident or 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 There is a fourth degree of disability benefits (permanent limited disability) but this type of benefits is 
already extinguished and it only consists on a one-time lump-sum payment.  
6 Benefit=Regulatory Base * Percentage 
professional illness, the regulatory base is calculated by dividing by 12 the wage in the 
last 365 days before becoming disabled.7 
Table 1. Summary of the parameters to calculate permanent disability pensions. 
 
Ordinary Illness Work-unrelated Accident 
Work-related 
Accident or 
Professional 
Illness 
Eligibility 
Age >= 31: 
Contributed 1/4 time 
between 20 years old 
and disabling condition. 
Minimum of 5 years No minimum 
contributory 
period required 
No minimum 
contributory 
period required 
Age < 30:  
Contributed 1/3 time 
between 16 years old 
and disabling condition. 
No minimum number of 
years required 
Regulatory 
Base 
Average wage last 8 
years of work 
Average annual 
wage of 24 
months within the 
last 7 years of 
work 
Average wage 
last year of work 
Percentage 
applied to the 
regulatory base 
Partial Disability: 55% 
Individuals older than 55 with difficulties to find a job due to lack 
of education or characteristics of the social and labor market of 
the region where they live: 75% 
Total Disability: 100% 
Severe Disability: 100%+50% 
 
3. Theoretical Model: A wage gap model between a non-disabled 
and a disabled worker 
We consider a wage determination setting for both non-disabled (n) and for partially 
disabled individuals (d). The total output of the firm generated by a non-disabled 
worker is !!, where the subscript t refers to time. In turn, the labor productivity of a 
disabled worker is reduced by a constant proportion ε. According to the Spanish 
disability system legislation, a partial disabled individual must work in a different job or 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 There was a reform in the calculation of the level of disability benefits for ordinary illness introduced in 
2008. After the reform, there was a percentage that depended on the number of years contributed to the 
system that was multiplied by the regulatory base. However, this change only affects individuals whose 
source of the disability is an ordinary illness and, in our sample, we only include individuals that are 
disabled due to an accident. Therefore, this reform does not affect our sample. 
professional activity to the one that he had before becoming disabled. Along this line, 
we also assume the presence of a productivity gap, !!, related to the assimilation costs 
of working in a different job or professional activity.8 This gap may disappear after a 
certain period spent working in the new job. The firm pays wages !!! and !!!  for each 
type of worker. As long as the firm employs a worker, the total payoff of the firm is !! − !!! for a non-disabled worker and !! 1− ! − !! − !!! for a disabled one. 
The firm and a worker are matched together under the presence of labor market 
frictions. Thus, if the firm and the worker separate, they will have to go through an 
expensive process of search before meeting another partner. Because of the presence of 
these labor market frictions the worker and the firm bargain over the wage. If they 
disagree, both types of workers receive an outside wage, bt, and the firm produces 
nothing. The parameter bt includes unemployment benefits and some level of home 
production net of search costs. Moreover, disabled individuals also receive partial 
disability pensions that are non-contingent to the working status. This pension is 
equivalent to a proportion, α, of their average wage for the years previous to the 
exogenous disability shock, !!!.  
We assume that wages are determined by Nash bargaining, where the worker has 
bargaining power β. The wages derived from the Nash bargaining solution are the !!!  
and !!!  that maximize the weighted product of the worker’s and the firm’s net return 
from the job match. Therefore, wages must satisfy the following conditions: 
 !!! = !"#!"# !! − !!! !!! !!! − !! !                              (1) 
 !!! = !"#!"# !! 1− ! − !! − !!! !!! !!! + !"!! − !! − !"!! !              (2) 
 
Notice that the disability pension, !"!! appears in the payoff,  !!! + !"!! , as well as in 
the outside option, !! + !"!! , of the weighted net return of the disabled worker because 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8The temporary component of the wage loss can also be related to the ability to adapt to the disability 
condition. For a discussion, see for example Wu (2001), Oswald and Powdthavee (2008) and more 
recently Braakmann (2012) and Bayer and Juessen (2012).  
disability benefits are not contingent to the working status. Nash bargaining between the 
worker and the firm will always lead to agreement and the negotiated wages will be 
 !!! = !!! + 1− ! !!        (3) 
 !!! = !!! 1− ! − !! + 1− ! !!      (4) 
 
The difference between expression (3) and (4) generates the following wage gap 
 !!! − !!! = !!! ! + !!           (5) 
 
Expression (5) shows that the wage gap of a disabled worker depends on a permanent 
and a transitory productivity gap. The permanent component ε is due to the disability 
condition after the disability shock while the transitory component is related to the 
presence of assimilation costs for being in a different job or professional activity, which 
reduces the implicit bargaining power of the disabled employee. 9 Thus, equation (5) 
suggests that the wage gap will be lower after some work experience in the new job. In 
particular, we expect that !"#!→∝ !! = 0. However, the permanent wage gap will 
remain over time. 
4. Empirical strategy: Average Treatment Effect on the Treated 
As explained above, we want to estimate how much the wages change, on average, for 
those individuals who become disabled due to an exogenous disability shock, compared 
to the hypothetical state of not having received the disability shock that causes the 
disabling condition. One of the main problems in measuring this change is the 
simultaneous determination of being disabled and wages. In particular, we want to 
know what would have happened to that individual if he or she had not become 
disabled. As we do not have that information, we make use of matching methods to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9This permanent component of the wage gap can also include discrimination related to the disability 
status (see for example Malo and Pagán (2012).  
allow for the counterfactual approach, associated with treatment effects techniques for 
program evaluation.  
Formally, let ! = 1,0 indicate if the individual is actually treated or not. In our case, if 
the individual becomes disabled or not. Let !  be the set of observed characteristics and  !!! and !!! be the potential salaries of interest if the individual is treated or non-
treated, respectively. The notion of “potential” is used to emphasize that only one of  !!! or !!! is observed for every individual in the sample.  
In this context we want to measure the Average Treatment Effect on the Treated 
(ATET), that is given by the following expression:  !"#" = ! = ! !!! −!!!|  !! = 1 = ! !!!|  !,!! = 1 − ! !!!|  !,!! = 1  
Clearly ! is not identified by the data, since we observe each individual in one of the 
possible states in each moment in time. Therefore, we do not observe the counterfactual. 
If we assume that the probability of becoming disabled is random, we could solve this 
problem by using the control group as a counterfactual. However, even though we have 
only taken the individuals that become disabled due to an accident, it could happen that 
those types of accidents that leave the individual impaired would occur in certain 
professions or sectors more than in others.  
Therefore, our empirical strategy relies on the fact that we have sufficient information 
on the characteristics of the individual and the type of job that he or she has had before 
the disabling condition occurs. In this context, we use the Propensity Score Matching to 
create subgroups where the treated and control individuals do not differ before the 
shock and then we use different matching techniques to compare the individual in the 
treated group that is most similar to an individual in the control group. Such method is 
attractive because it represents an improvement compared to other parametric and semi-
parametric approaches to program evaluation since it avoids many potential biases due 
to model specification.10   
In particular, our conditional independence assumption is: (!!! ,!!!) ⊥ !|! 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 See Heckman and Horz (1989), Heckman, Ichimura and Todd (1997) and Blundell and Costa Dias 
(2002) are just some of the articles that explain how to evaluate certain treatments (in our case disability) 
using matching procedures. 
This assumption, which is known as selection on observables, was introduced by Rubin 
(1973, 1974) and Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983, 1984). 
5. Database and sample selection 
The study will use the Continuous Sample of Working Lives (“Muestra Continua de 
Vidas Laborales”, MCVL) which is a microeconomic dataset based on administrative 
records provided by the Spanish Social Security Administration. It contains a random 
sample of 4% of all the individuals who, at some point during 2010, had contributed to 
the social security system (either by working or being on an unemployment scheme) or 
had received a contributory pension.11 The random sample selected contains over one 
million people. 
There is information available on the entire employment and pension history of the 
workers, including the exact duration of employment, unemployment and disability 
pension spells, and for each spell, several variables that describe the characteristics of 
the job or the unemployment/disability benefits. There is also some information on 
personal characteristics such as age, gender, nationality and level of education. 
For the treatment group, we select all individuals that become partially disabled due to 
an exogenous disability shock (accident) between 1996 and 2010. We do not include 
individuals that become totally disabled as the definition of total disability stresses that 
this group of individuals is not able to develop any kind of job. As our interest lies in 
estimating the wage (or productivity) lost due to the disabling disability shock, we 
exclude total disability holders from our sample. For the group of partially disabled 
individuals due to an exogenous disability shock, we include the wage of June of the 
year before becoming disabled as well as the wage that they are earning each June of 
each year that they are in the disability rolls and working on June 15th. Of course, not 
all individuals in the disability system are effectively working but they are all legally 
allowed to work because they are in the partial disability scheme. We also have 
information on the amount of disability benefits that they receive and we will use this 
information in some of our estimations.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 This means that the only individuals that are missing from this database are those who were inactive in 
2010and did not receive any kind of contributory benefit (such as disability, orphan, widow, etc…). 
Furthermore, the sample is representative for 2010 but, as exit from the disability system is extremely 
low, we belief that the sample is also representative for the other years included in the analysis. 
With respect to the control group, we include a 10% random sample of everybody who 
is in our database between 1996 and 2010 and who will never receive disability benefits 
(due to any reason, common illness or accident).12  We select the employment status of 
each of these individuals on 15th June of each year and we use the wage of June of each 
year that they are reported as working. 
The selected sample contains 125.717 individuals (1.120.607 person-year observations 
in total), 71.917 of them are men while 53.800 are women. 2.762 of these individuals in 
our sample move to disability benefits due to an exogenous disability shock at some 
point between 1996 and 2010 and are, thus, our treatment group while 122.955 
individuals never become disabled in our sample period and constitute our control 
group. We have selected such a large control group in order to ensure a good matching 
process and to make sure that we maximize the options of finding a similar individual in 
our control group for each individual that we have in the treatment group.	  
6. Constructing the treatment and control groups 
In order to construct the treatment and control groups we use the MCVL and we follow 
a similar methodology as in Lechner and Vazquez-Alvarez (2004) and García-Gomez 
and López-Nicolás (2006). In particular, our treated group is formed by individuals who 
were non-disabled in t=1, become partially disabled by an exogenous disability shock 
(accident) in t=2 and continue being partially disabled in t=3.13 As explained before, we 
consider only individuals that become disabled due to an accident to avoid individuals 
that start receiving disability benefits due to a common illness, because these disabled 
individuals may already have a reduced labor income at t=1, before becoming officially 
disabled, and that would bias our results. We want similar individuals in t=1, in the 
moment that we construct the propensity score. Therefore, we follow the following 
strategy: 
(1) We consider a window of three years for each observed individual.  Therefore, 
with annual date we require at least three waves to generate a sequence.  In our 
case, we have 14 possible sequences of three years, because our data set covers 
the period 1996-2010.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 We take a 10% random sample as we have too many individuals in the original sample. 
13 Only 1.1% of individuals stop receiving partial disability benefits in our sample. Therefore, we 
consider partial disability as an absorbing state as exit from the partial disability system is very low.
(2) For each sequence we select individuals who are healthy (not disabled) and are 
employed at t=1.	  
(3) Our treatment group are individuals who meet the selection criteria (2) and also 
become disabled due to an exogenous disability shock at t=2 and remain 
disabled at t=3. The sequence of health status for these individuals is No 
Disabled, Disabled, Disabled (ND,D,D).	  
(4) The control or comparison group are individuals who meet selection criteria (2), 
but in this case continue to be non-disabled both in t=2 as in t=3. Therefore they 
experienced the sequence No Disabled, No Disabled, No Disabled 
(ND,ND,ND). Table 2 shows the dynamics of the data, the formation of the 
sequences and the possible combinations between the treated and control 
samples over time.14  
(5) We match individuals in the treated and control groups with the propensity score 
in t=1, where both individuals were non-disabled. We use: age, age squared, 
professional category, sequence, sex, nationality and wages at t=1 as regressors.  
Since we use a longitudinal database we can use the outcomes before the 
individual becomes or does not become disabled in the vector of conditioning 
variables (for example, the wages in t=1). 
Table 2: Definition of treatment and control groups 
TREATMENT	  SAMPLE:	  ND,D,D	  
Sequence	   1994	   1995	   1996	   1997	   …	   2007	   2008	   2009	   2010	  
1	   ND	   D	   D	   	   	   	   	   	   	  	  
2	   	   ND	   D	   D	   	   	   	   	   	  	  
….	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  	  
13	   	   	   	   	   	   ND	   D	   D	   	  	  
14	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   ND	   D	   D	  
CONTROL	  SAMPLE:	  ND,ND,ND	  
Sequence	   1994	   1995	   1996	   1997	   …	   2007	   2008	   2009	   2010	  
1	   ND	   ND	   ND	   	   	   	   	   	   	  	  
2	   	   ND	   ND	   ND	   	   	   	   	   	  	  
….	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  	  
13	   	   	   	   	   	   ND	   ND	   ND	   	  	  
14	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   ND	   ND	   ND	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 An individual who is in the control group in one sequence, can be a control unit for any given sequence 
and count as independent observation for each of the different sequences. However, individuals who 
appear as treatment unit can only appear in one sequence, because, once he or she becomes disabled, he 
or she will remain disabled permanently. Only once the individual can experience the sequence ND,D,D 
7. Descriptive statistics 
Table 3 presents samples size for the treated and control groups for the different 
subsamples that we consider in our estimations.  
Table 3: Samples size for treated and control groups. 
	  	   Treated	  (ND,	  D,	  D)	  	   Control	  (ND,	  ND,	  ND)	  	  
Conditional	  on	  working	  in	  the	  first	  
year	  of	  the	  sequence.	   1718	   530759	  
Conditional	  on	  working	  in	  the	  first	  and	  
third	  year	  of	  the	  sequence	   356	   473627	  
Conditional	  on	  working	  in	  the	  first,	  the	  
third,	  the	  forth…..and	  the	  seventh	  
year	  of	  the	  sequence	   189	   310536	  
 
As we can observe in the table 3, the number of observations that we have in the control 
group is very high, this is because we have a very large sample since the data come 
from the social security registers and also because an individual who is in the control 
group in one sequence, can be a control unit for any given sequence and count as 
independent observation for each of the different sequences. Having so many 
observations in the control group and using our matching technique allows us to choose 
the individual in the control group that is more similar in characteristics to the treated 
individual before the shock occurs. 
The first row of table 3 shows the number of observations that we have when we 
analyse the effects of the disabling condition independently on whether the individual 
works the shock occurs. In this case we condition only on working before the shock and 
we analyse the effects on the amount of wages plus the disability benefits. The second 
row shows the number of observations we have if we restrict our sample to include only 
individuals who have worked in the year before and the year after the shock occurs. 
Finally, in the last column we have the number of observations used to explore what 
happens to the wage gap over time. The number of treated individuals is small because 
the condition is very restrictive, are individuals who become disabled at t=2 and 
continue being disabled at t=3, t=4, t=5, t=6 and t=7. 
Table 4: Descriptive statistics of different wage measures. 
	  	   Treated	   Control	  	  
	  	   Mean	   Std	  Dev	   Mean	   Std	  Dev	  
Conditional	  on	  working	  in	  t=3	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	  
Wage1	  in	  t=3	   1389,15	   1267,22	   1584,55	   995,76	  
Wage1	  +	  Pension	   2282,19	   1390,74	   1584,55	   995,76	  
Wage2	  in	  t=3	   1204,43	   658,99	   1322,42	   1041,28	  
Wage2	  +	  Pension	   2097,46	   873,95	   1322,42	   1041,28	  
	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	  
Independently	  if	  they	  work	  in	  t=3	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	  
Wage1	  +	  Pension	   1283,2	   869,89	   1502,63	   1026,02	  
Wage2	  +	  Pension	   1244,5	   728,21	   1292,9	   1020,69	  
 
Table 4 shows some descriptive statistics about the different wage measures that we use 
in the estimations. As we can see, wages in the treated group are lower than wages in 
the control group after the shock. When we add the disability benefits (pension), we 
obtain different results, depending on whether we condition the sample to include only 
those who work at t=3 or not. If we condition on working at t=3, something that the 
partial disabled can do, we obtain that the sum of the benefits and wages is greater for 
the treated than for the control group. However, taking into account all the disabled in 
the sample, independently of whether they work or not, the sum of wages plus the 
pension is less for the treated group. This result shows how some disabled people, 
although the law allows them to work, decide not to work and live only with the benefit 
that they receive from the disability system.  
8. Results 
In this section we calculate the impact of becoming disabled on different measures of 
wages. We try to answer the following question: What is the effect of receiving a 
disability shock and becoming disabled on the wages of the disabled compared to the 
wages in the hypothetical state of not having become disabled? 
We estimate ATET effects following Becker and Ichino (2002), Abadie and Imbens 
(2002) and Abadie et al. (2004). First, we estimate the propensity score (the probability 
of being in the treatment group) by a probit specification due to the fact that we have 
two possible states (ND,D,D versus ND,ND,ND). We used age, age squared, 
professional category, sequence, sex, nationality and wages at t=1 as explanatory 
variables. The specification passes the “balancing hypothesis”.15 This means that there 
are no systematic differences in observable characteristics between the treated and 
control groups once we condition on the propensity score. After that, we match treated 
and control individuals using different methods. In particular, we use the: (i) nearest 
neighbor matching and the (ii) kernel matching method. There is no a priori element to 
prefer one of these methods. Therefore, we present the results of all estimates to assess 
the robustness of the results. 
8.1 Effects of becoming disabled on wages. 
Table 5 presents the estimates of the ATET of disability on different measures of 
earnings in t=3, the year after the treated individuals become disabled. We use two 
different measures of earnings: the monthly average wage in June (we call that measure 
wage 1) 16 and a monthly average of the wage of all the year (we call that measure wage 
2).17 
In fact, what we don’t use wages as such but a proxy for wages, the contributory base 
over which the contributions to the Social Security administration are calculated and 
paid. As it often occurs with Social Security records, wages in the MCVL are top- and 
bottom-coded, that is, they are censored. Although for the entire MCVL this is a 
significant problem as Bonhomme and Hospido (2009) mention, such an issue is likely 
not to be empirically relevant in our case as wages are censored only for very few 
observations. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 We also have tried with other variables like education, sector of activity, but at the end we have 
selected those who generate a better match. 
16 We take into account the number of days worked during the month. In fact, we divide the wage 
received in June by the total number of days worked. After that, we multiply this figure by 30 in order to 
have a monthly wage. 
17 In this case we sum the wage received in all the months worked and then we divide this wage by the 
total number of month worked to obtain a monthly measure. 
 All the estimations using both wage measures show a significant reduction in the 
monthly wage for the disabled due to the disabling condition.  As our theoretical model 
presented in Section 2 suggests, that reduction is probably due both to a fall in 
productivity generated by the fact of becoming disabled (permanent productivity shock) 
and also by a temporary productivity shock related to the fact that these individuals 
have to change jobs and have, therefore, a learning process in the new job. In section 
5.3 we will develop this point further. 
Table 5: Effects of disability on wages at t=3 
	  	  
Nearest-­‐Neighbor	  
Matching	  
Kernel	  matching	  
method	  
Wage	  1	   -­‐293.38	   -­‐342.21	  
	   (97.83)	   (81.99)	  
Wage	  2	   -­‐516.37	   -­‐495.83	  
	   (69,41)	   (46.19)	  
Note: Money figures are expressed in 2010 euros. Bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses. 
For instances, using our first measure of wage and the nearest neighbor matching 
method, the reduction of the wage of the disabled is 293 euros per month expressed in 
constant terms at 2010 prices. If we use the kernel matching method, the reduction is a 
bit higher, 342 euros per month. As we have seen above that the average wage for the 
individuals working at t=3 is 1389,15 euros per month, this wage gap represents 
between 21% and 24% of the wage of a disabled worker (depending on the matching 
method applied). The reduction is a bit higher when we consider the second measure of 
wages with both matching methods and represents between 41 and 42% of the average 
wage of the disabled.  
8.2 Does the disability benefit offset this gap? 
An important point is whether the benefits or pensions that are received by these 
disabled individuals are able to compensate the lower wages that they get. Therefore, 
this subsection tries to discern to what extend the social security provisions compensate 
for the loss of wage that we observe in Section 8.1.  In other words, we try to see if, 
once we take into account the amount earned in disability benefits, the income gap 
between our treated group and our control groups is maintained. 
Since the disability pension can be received independently of the working status of the 
individual, we do the exercise for two subsamples. In Table 6 we work with the 
subsample of disabled individuals who continue working after the shock of becoming 
disabled. Therefore, we have a sample of individuals (in the treated and in the control 
group) that work in t=3. Instead, in table 7 we do not condition the disabled to work in 
t=3 and therefore our sample of disabled individuals includes individuals that may or 
may not work. In both tables we consider the sum of wages, if they work, plus the 
disability benefits. 
Table 6: Effects of the disability on the wages plus pension  
for the disabled who work in t=3 
	  	  
Nearest-­‐
Neighbor	  
Matching	  
Kernel	  
matching	  
method	  
wage	  1+	  pension	   607.63	   558.81	  
	   (104.50)	   (85.99)	  
wage	  2+	  pension	   384.63	   405.18	  
	   (78.57)	   (57.08)	  
Note: Money figures are expressed in 2010 euros. Bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses. 
Table 7: Effects of the disability on the wages plus pension for all the disabled, 
independently if they work in t=3 
	  	  
Nearest-­‐
Neighbor	  
Matching	  
Kernel	  
matching	  
method	  
wage	  1+	  pension	   -­‐287.87	   -­‐359.74	  
	  	   (32.09)	   	  (25.41)	  
wage	  2+	  pension	   -­‐320.54	   -­‐404.64	  
	  	   (29.14)	   	  (24.13)	  
Note: Money figures are expressed in 2010 euros. Bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses. 
In table 6 we note that, when we condition on the subsample of individuals working in 
t=3, the sum of the wage plus the disability pension is greater in the treated group than 
in the control group. This means that the pension for this subgroup of disabled workers 
more than offsets the drop in wages observed in Section 5.1, regardless of the matching 
method and the definition of wages (wage 1 or wage 2) that we use. 
However, when we do not condition on the fact that individuals work in t=3, we note in 
table 7 that the benefits do not offset all the fall in income. These individuals, in the 
hypothetical case of not having become disabled, would have obtained a higher income 
by just working. 
8.3 What happens with the gap over time? 
In this section, we consider a longer period sequence in order corroborate the hypothesis 
of our theoretical model that part of the wage gap between our treated and control group 
should decrease over time due to the reduction in the temporary productivity gap.  
As explained before, partially disabled worker who receive a pension can continue 
working but not in the same job than they had before the disability shock. Therefore, 
they have to change the job after being granted the disability benefits. In the new job, 
we will expect a drop in their productivity and therefore, we expect a drop in the wages 
that they receive. This drop in productivity, as our model in section 3 has shown, can be 
broken down into two elements: first, a permanent fall due to the fact of becoming 
disabled, with a permanent fall in the wages associated to those individuals; and second, 
a transitory fall in productivity caused by the fact that the new job requires a learning 
process. We expect that the transitory fall in productivity, and therefore in wages will 
tend to disappear over the years. 
Therefore, in this section we want to see how much of the wage gap observed in Section 
5.1 is due to a permanent fall in productivity (due to the disability shock experienced) 
and what part of the fall of the productivity is transitory.   
We restrict our sample to individuals who work from t=3 to t=7 to ensure that we are 
analysing the fall in wages for the same individuals. We want to see if the drop in wages 
remains constant or decreases with time. We also want to see if the fall in wages is 
continue or if, at some point, it stabilizes and reaches a constant value. 
Table 8 shows that, for the two measures of wages and for the two matching methods 
used, wages for disabled workers are lower than wages in the control group.  
	  
	  
	  
	  
Table 8: wage gap over time: permanent and transitory fall in productivity 
    t=3 t=4 t=5 t=6 t=7 
Nearest-­‐
Neighbor	  
Matching	  
Wage	  1	  	   -­‐261,02	   -­‐210,79	   -­‐172,36	   -­‐152,13	   -­‐151,46	  
	   (101.84)	   (105.03)	   (106.3)	   (110.93)	   (106.15)	  
Wage	  2	   -­‐409,57	   -­‐392,24	   -­‐379,58	   -­‐231,9	   -­‐230,94	  
	  	   (106.17)	   (110.78)	   (106.68)	   (110.63)	   (111.25)	  
Kernel	  
matching	  
method	  
Wage	  1	  	   -­‐361,84	   -­‐353,79	   -­‐329,98	   -­‐315,81	   -­‐315,03	  
	   (78.19)	   (88.56)	   (105.42)	   (84.87)	   	  (93.59)	  
Wage	  2	   -­‐480,03	   -­‐453,05	   -­‐421,74	   -­‐372,84	   -­‐371,72	  
	  	   	  (65.44)	   	  (88.74)	   	  (70.90)	   	  (72.47)	   	  (98.91)	  
Note: Money figures are expressed in 2010 euros. Bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses. 
We tested for different periods of years and we observe that the pay gap between the 
disabled and the non-disabled individuals falls over time. This means that the transitory 
drop in productivity is disappearing. However, we observe a constant wage gap 
associated with the permanent fall in productivity. Table 8 shows that for t=6 and t=7 
(ie, 4 and 5 years after having become disabled) the difference in the wages becomes 
permanent and it remains relatively constant. 
9. Conclusions 
Despite several policies that aim at ensuring that disabled individuals have the same 
labour market opportunities than their non-disabled counterparts (such as anti-
discrimination and labour promotion policies), Spain is characterized by having very 
low employment rates for disabled individuals when compared to other OECD 
countries. Therefore, in this paper we explore whether disabled workers in Spain have 
yet another disadvantage in terms of labour market opportunities by testing whether the 
onset of an unexpected disabling condition does also entail reduced earnings for the 
disabled. At the same time, we are also interested in analysing whether this wage gap 
with respect to their non-disabled counterparts is permanent in time or is reduced over 
time. In other words, we want to know if disabled individuals are able to “catch up” in 
terms of wages lost due to the disabling condition. 
In order to do that, we present both a theoretical and an empirical model that allows us 
to identify the effects of disability on wages and the channels underlying this 
relationship. In the theoretical wage gap model we assume that the wage gap of a 
disabled worker depends on a permanent and a transitory productivity gap. The 
permanent component is due to the disability condition after the disability shock while 
the transitory component is related to the presence of assimilation costs for being in a 
different job or professional activity, which reduces the implicit bargaining power of the 
disabled employee. Thus, the model predicts that the wage gap will be lower after some 
work experience in the new job (reduction of the temporary component of the wage 
gap) but that the permanent wage gap will remain. 
We proceed by testing this theoretical hypothesis with an empirical model in which we 
want to estimate how much wages change, on average, for those individuals who 
become disabled due to an exogenous disability shock, compared to the hypothetical 
state of not having received the disability shock that causes the disabling condition. We 
also empirically estimate the evolution of this wage gap over time in order to check 
whether the predictions of the theoretical model are fulfilled. As one of the main 
problems in measuring this change is the endogeneity of the disability status and the 
wages, we only include in our sample individuals that become disabled due to an 
accident and estimate the Average Treatment Effect on the Treated (ATET). Therefore, 
we want to know what would have happened to that individual if he or she had not 
become disabled (counterfactual) and, as we do not have that information, we make use 
of matching methods. In particular we estimate the effect of disability on wages by 
matching on the propensity score. 
In all our specifications, we find that the reduction of the wage for the disabled is 
between 293 and 342 euros per month expressed in constant terms at 2010 prices 
(between 21 and 24% of the average wage of a disabled worker) but this reduction is 
more than offset when we take as the income measure both the wage and the disability 
benefits that they get for the group of individuals that work. For the entire group of 
disabled individuals (the ones that work and the ones that do not have a job), we still 
find a drop in income for the disabled relative to the non-disabled individuals even 
when we add up the wage and the benefits. Therefore, those individuals would have 
obtained a higher income by just working in the hypothetical case of not having 
suffered the disabling condition. Finally, we observe that the pay gap between the 
disabled and the non-disabled individuals falls over time as predicted in the theoretical 
model so that the transitory drop in productivity is disappearing. However, we observe a 
constant wage gap associated with the permanent fall in productivity predicted in the 
theoretical model that remains constant over time. 
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